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Abstract: Phylogenetic trees are meant to represent the 
genealogical history of life and apparently derive their justification 
from the existence of the tree of life and the fact that evolutionary 
processes are tree-like. However, there are a number of problems 
for these assumptions. Here it is argued that once we understand 
the important role that phylogenetic trees play as models which 
contain idealizations, we can accept these criticisms and deny the 
reality of the tree while justifying the continued use of trees in 
phylogenetic theory and preserving nearly all of what defenders of 
trees have called “the importance of tree-thinking.”  
 
 
1. Introduction to Phylogenetic Trees 
Evolutionary biology is a historical science. Phylogenetic trees represent the 
history of lineages and lineage splits through time. Constructing trees is the 
starting point for nearly every study in evolutionary biology today. Trees provide 
the historical information that is used as the essential background framing for 
explanations, reconstructing events in the past, and understanding trends through 
time. It is not surprising that a common paraphrase of Dobzhansky's famous 
dictum about evolution is that “Nothing makes sense except in the light of 
phylogeny.” 
 
The ability to properly read and understand trees is what Robert O’Hara (1988) 
memorably termed “tree-thinking.” As he later put it, “Just as beginning students 
in geography need to be taught how to read maps, so beginning students in 
biology should be taught how to read trees and to understand what trees 
communicate” (O’Hara 1997). This is especially important given our common 
tendencies toward group (class/kind) thinking and ladder thinking as well as the 
ubiquity of misleading diagrams of evolutionary history (see Baum and Smith 
2012).  
 
It was Darwin in The Origin (1859) who first used trees to emphasize the 
importance and explanatory power of common ancestry. For example, the 
phenomenon of homology was well-known before The Origin, but it was unclear 
why, for example, bats, birds, crocs, frogs, humans, and turtles would have the 
same (homologous) bone structure in their limbs - a humerus attached to a radius 
and ulna, attached to carpals, metacarpals, and phalanges, etc. - despite the 
obviously different functions that these limbs performed. We can see how Darwin 
explained homology by examining figure 1. 
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Figure 1: A phylogenetic tree of some chordate groups with the 
origin of a few key traits marked. 
 
The tree represents the passage of time from left to right with the tips of the tree 
representing extant groups. The tetrapods: amphibians, reptiles, mammals, and 
birds all have four limbs with a common limb structure, whereas all these except 
the amphibians have a water-tight egg. Darwin’s explanation of why these groups 
have the common tetrapod limb structure is that it evolved once in the 
evolutionary past in one particular group and has been transmitted down the 
braches to all the descendants of that group. Similarly, the water-tight egg evolved 
one time (on the amniote branch after it split from the amphibian branch) and was 
passed down.  
 
We can already see from this example the key features of the information that 
trees convey. We assume that traits are passed downstream on a branch and we 
assume that they are not passed on to any non-downstream branches. Lineage 
separation represents isolation.   
 
Moving from the fact that homologous traits could possibly be explained by 
common ancestry to the truth of the nested hierarchy and the branching structure 
of the tree is not trivial. Perhaps other structures might also explain homologous 
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traits. On the special creation model, the tetrapod limb is simply a good design 
structure. It is not that hard to see why a creator might reuse a design multiple 
times if it is simply a good design. On a ladder or great chain of being picture, we 
can imagine that there is some kind of hierarchy of traits, the lower creatures 
having the basic ones while the more advanced creatures have more and more of 
the advanced traits until finally, humans are the only earthly species with the 
highest traits (like intelligence). 
 
The easiest way to see the problem with the ladder is to think about multiple 
traits. On the ladder picture, a single trait can divide species into two groups – 
those that have the trait in question and those that don’t (hair divides mammals 
from everything else). We could think of a linear ordering of all of these groups 
with those that don’t have the trait as more ancestral than those that do. But when 
we look at a second trait (say feathers), it will group different organisms into the 
‘higher’ category (birds vs. non-birds). So who is higher on the evolutionary 
ladder, mammals or birds? The obvious answer is that there are at least two 
ladders. And if we look at traits only found in turtles (like the shell) it is obvious 
that neither birds nor mammals came from turtles, rather, there is a third line 
leading to turtles and so on. This reasoning leads to a branching explanation of 
trait distribution, not a ladder explanation. 
 
Of course naturalists were long aware of the distribution of traits and Lamarck’s 
ladder can’t be used to explain homology. Notice in Figure 1 that all of the groups 
that have a water-tight egg also have four limbs. One group is nested inside the 
other. On the other hand, there are no organisms with gizzards that also have hair. 
Those groups are completely disjoint. If every trait evolved only once, we could 
map the traits onto a tree and form a perfect group-within-group structure that 
would be the phylogenetic tree of life. It would directly give us our trait-based 
classification of groups in a nested hierarchy. Linnaeus already had the 
hierarchical part of the tree structure, but he had no explanation for this. The 
branching of genealogy explains the hierarchy of classification and nothing else 
does. This is why Darwin considered the evidence from hierarchical classification 
to be the strongest evidence for his theory. Nesting is logically consistent with 
special creation, but it is explained by a tree-like common ancestry.  
 
This centrality of tree-like ancestry manifests itself in the ubiquitous use of 
phylogenetic trees across different problem areas. Treatments of many problems 
in systematics require the use of phylogenetic trees. Studying adaptation, 
biogeography, or comparative biology all require the use of trees. More general 
framework questions such as to what extent there is a molecular clock can only be 
answered once a phylogeny is in place. Testing trends, such as whether mammals 
have increased in size over time, requires the tree. Basically, for any questions 
that can only be answered in the light of knowing the history of the group, the 
phylogenetic tree is the essential background information needed to get started 
answering such a question. More generally, historical information is required for 
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systematic studies. What I will call the realist defense of trees says why this is so: 
trees are essential precisely because they represent the real history.  
 
2. Worries for the Tree of Life 
The centrality of phylogenetic trees extends to the construction of the universal 
tree of life.  But there are serious problems with that tree. Many biologists have 
claimed that there is no such thing and that tree-thinking can often constrain us 
and blind us to the truth. For detailed arguments, see the special issues on the tree 
of life in Biology and Philosophy (2010) and Biology Direct (2011). For brief 
overviews, see O’Malley et al. (2010) and Velasco (forthcoming). Here, I will 
mention only some of the most serious issues, which have an important feature in 
common. 
 
A natural way to think about individual phylogenetic trees is that they are subtrees 
of the big, universal tree of life, which represents how all species are connected 
(Velasco 2010).  Some worries are specific to the universal tree of life. For 
example, it is not clear that there is a single, universal common ancestor at the 
root of the tree. But here, it must be pointed out that this is a special problem for 
the universal tree and for deep time questions such as the origin of cells. Even if 
in the end, we must give up the belief in the universal tree, this has no direct 
consequences for the existence of trees at smaller scales. If we are looking at a 
tree of Darwin’s finches, then as long as they do in fact have a uniquely shared 
origin, there is no parallel problem with there being a single rooted tree in this 
domain which serves exactly the same explanatory purposes and plays exactly the 
same inferential role as before. There is no need to overgeneralize to all life in 
order to justify the use of particular trees.  
 
Perhaps the most dramatic problem with the tree is endosymbiosis. In 
endosymbiosis, one organism comes to live inside another and eventually 
becomes an obligate symbiote.  Over time, they are so tightly interconnected, that 
it is no longer appropriate to think of the situation as one organism living inside 
another, but rather, as one integrated organism. Different understandings of 
endosymbiosis will be more or less strict about what counts as a new entity, but 
even on the most conservative understandings, the origins of mitochondria and 
chloroplasts will count as two separate lineages merging into one and the origin of 
the eukaryotic cell itself might be such an event (O’Malley 2010). Endosymbiosis 
could hardly be more important to the history of life on this planet. But 
endosymbiosis involves the combination and complete transformation of two 
lineages - sometimes as distantly related as is possible on Earth - and fuses them 
into a completely new lineage of a new kind of organism.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the tree typically represents genealogical connections 
between species and thus separations of lineages represent the genetic isolation of 
different species. But we know that organisms of different species can and do 
hybridize. Mallet (2005) surveys a variety of studies of hybrids and concludes that 
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at least 25% of plant and 10% of animal species form hybrids with other species 
in nature.   
 
The most common way for different species to share genetic information is via 
lateral gene transfer where genetic information is physically transferred from one 
organism to another pre-existing organism. Lateral gene transfer (LGT) had been 
conclusively shown in the 1940s to happen in the lab and it was known to be 
responsible for the spread of antibiotic resistance in the 1960s (Sapp 2009). But 
just how widespread in nature LGT was, was not known. It is now known to be 
pervasive. Traits that are transferred from one lineage to another via LGT show 
that there is something wrong with our tree explanation of the distribution of 
many homologous traits. It isn’t that there is some other explanation to explain 
their nested group-within-group structure. Rather, for a great many traits, they are 
not distributed in a group-within-group hierarchy in the first place. LGT 
undermines central systematic concepts like phylogeny, lineage, and species and 
O’Malley and Boucher (2005) consider LGT to be the major cause of an ongoing 
paradigm shift in microbiology beyond just its role in systematics.  
 
Endosymbiosis between lineages, hybridization between species, and lateral gene 
transfer between organisms all show that there are possible routes by which 
changes on one lineage can have cross-stream, rather than just downstream, 
effects on other lineages. Crucially, this is inconsistent with a branching tree 
pattern. If we take seriously the realist idea that the tree of life represents the 
genealogical pattern of evolutionary history, then the “tree” will not be a 
phylogenetic tree but, rather, a complicated web or network of some sort. Even 
very simplified drawings will look something like figure 2. 
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Figure 2: A web of life which represents the history of lineages when we take into 
account various lateral transfers of genetic information as well as vertical 
reproduction. Taken from Doolittle (1999). 
 
The empirical evidence is clear; there are a great many non-tree-like processes 
which produce non-tree-like genealogical patterns in nature. The realist is forced 
to become a realist about networks rather than trees. 
 
3. Modeling and Idealization 
These attacks on the reality of the tree structure in nature are not easily dismissed. 
Defenders of trees will often attempt to minimize just how bad things are by 
arguing that endosymbiosis and hybridization are rare, or that lateral gene transfer 
happens only in prokaryotes (only in the vast majority of life on earth?!).  
Common responses from those who attack the use of trees is that these 
phenomena are much more widespread than commonly appreciated. While I agree 
that the extent of such phenomena is widely under-appreciated, such empirical 
questions can hardly matter to the realist who is trying to insist that evolutionary 
history is accurately represented by a single tree. It is not. Whether hybridization 
is rare or common, it is clearly not nonexistent and from the realist point of view, 
that is all that matters. 
 
However, debates about the extent of these phenomena make perfect sense if we 
think about trees as models. Here the relevant question is not whether the history 
is a tree, but how good is a model that depicts history as a tree (Franklin-Hall 
2010). We can call the modeling defense of trees the view that trees are useful 
because they are very good models. Models contain idealizations. Roughly, 
idealizations deliberately simplify or alter something complicated in order to 
better understand it or to better understand something else. Philosophers of 
science have pointed to a number of different ways that idealizations are used in 
scientific practice. Here I will follow Weisberg (2007) in distinguishing three 
kinds of idealizations. While Weisberg’s particular taxonomy of idealizations is 
not essential to my project, it does provide a useful expository strategy.  
 
First, there are examples of minimalist idealizations. Here, the model contains 
only the core causal factors that are relevant in the situation at hand. Obviously, 
there are many aspects of genealogy that a tree does not represent. If we have a 
tree representing the great ape species, we know that traits are actually inherited 
by individual organisms, not by species. But for at least some uses of trees, these 
details are simply ignored as irrelevant to the problem at hand. We can treat 
character traits as being transmitted by lineages along branches of the tree without 
any problems. This kind of idealization has been called abstraction (cf. 
Cartwright 1989) or Aristotelian idealization (Frigg and Hartmann 2006). It is 
easy to see how abstracting away from details that don’t matter could help us 
better understand and explain some phenomenon like the particular distribution of 
traits.  
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While sometimes we can abstract away from irrelevant details, other times, we 
idealize away details that do make a difference. However, even in some of those 
cases we are justified in thinking that the effects are small for the purposes at 
hand and that, therefore, it is permissible to ignore them. For example, tree 
models assume that once a lineage splits from another, changes such as mutations 
on one lineage don’t affect isolated lineages. Hybridization and lateral gene 
transfer show this assumption to be false. Sometimes we simply ignore these 
effects as real, but small. Inferences that use trees will assume no such effects, but 
as long as you are aware of these possibilities, you will reason that you are just 
making a fallible inference when you infer that, for example, a trait has evolved 
independently in two different lineages.  
 
The systematics of the past is dominated by minimalist idealization. Those who 
built the first trees such as Darwin and Haeckel were well aware of hybridization. 
But often, they were attempting to capture broad-scale features of the history such 
as the connections between the different classes of vertebrates or the different 
orders of birds. The messy details of speciation were simply irrelevant for these 
purposes. In contrast, systematists of the late 20th century built trees at all scales 
and here the details of hybridization do matter. Yet often, these details were 
simply ignored.  
 
We now know that simply ignoring lateral effects will not do. Here, the empirical 
studies on the extent of lateral gene transfer and hybridization really matter. In 
these cases, there is also a particular kind of problem that arises from initially just 
ignoring these lateral effects. If you don’t bother looking for lateral events, you 
will build a tree that is capable of fitting the data and may not notice that anything 
has gone awry. Standard phylogenetic methods simply assume that the data is 
generated from a tree process and then find the best tree to fit the data. This is no 
way to detect whether a tree is the right kind of structure in the first place (Sober 
2008). One simply cannot detect lateral events unless you specifically look for 
them. And there is no way of knowing ahead of time if you are working with a 
group where lateral events play an important causal and explanatory role.  
 
Now that we know that lateral events can significantly affect our understanding of 
the history of particular groups, systematists today often attempt to directly 
estimate the incidence and effects of lateral events such as gene transfer or 
hybridization, as well as the effects from vertical transmission.  
 
In these cases, a second type of idealization is often used. This is Galilean 
idealization, the introduction and later removal of deliberate distortions. The 
name is due to examples such as where Galileo assumes that the Earth is flat over 
a short distance or that a rolling ball is perfectly spherical (McMullin 1985). 
Sometimes the removal of the distortion will make a non-negligible difference, 
but this difference can then be estimated and we can still see that the original 
idealization was an essential part of the overall inference process. 
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Phylogenetic networks that contain lateral branches as well as horizontal branches 
are sometimes constructed by first building the tree that best fits the data. Then 
we look for anomalies in the data, by, for example, adding lateral branches one at 
a time and checking to see if the measure of fit (say a Parsimony or Likelihood 
score) is improved by a sufficient amount. If so, add the branch and then look for 
more. While this is an improvement over ignoring possible lateral effects, this 
procedure is analogous to doing a multiple regression by examining one variable 
at a time and there are well known methodological problems with all such greedy 
methods (Velasco and Sober 2010). Some kind of “find the best network all at 
once” approach is needed.  
 
Most of the work that I described above still operates under the realist assumption 
that we are trying to find and represent the one true history of the group. This 
history is complicated, but in principle, it is what we want to know if we are to 
make further inferences. Much of the best work in systematics today in fact does 
quite a good job of inferring very complicated historical structures and patterns. 
But after reflecting on the fact that trees and networks are simply models of the 
history, new possibilities are opened up. It is here that I think the most exciting 
and ultimately the most fruitful work in systematics will be done. Here, we 
acknowledge that we are building models to use for inferences and that these 
models will contain idealizations which are not entirely accurate. But we accept 
that there is no need to show that these idealizations are harmless. In fact, they 
can be beneficial to our inferences and explanations. 
 
The third kind of idealization is multiple models idealization which involves “the 
practice of building multiple related but incompatible models, each of which 
makes distinct claims about the nature and causal structure giving rise to a 
phenomenon” (Weisberg 2007, 645). Here, we do not expect a single, best model 
to be the final product. Rather, each model involves tradeoffs of better 
representing some aspects of reality at the cost of a worse representation of others. 
An obvious parallel is the case of maps. Some maps of New York City focus on 
the layout of the streets and ignore topographical features, others carefully note 
changes in altitude but would not help you if you were lost trying to find the 
library (Toulmin 1953, Kitcher 2001). This kind of tradeoff is clear in the 
decision to represent a group by a tree or a network. We can represent the history 
of lineages quite well with trees, but this will ignore connections such as those 
due to lateral gene transfer. But complicated networks that attempt to represent all 
such connections distort or even destroy the history of the lineages and cellular 
reproduction events. In general, we can imagine that different models of the 
phylogeny of the same groups idealize different aspects of this genealogy in 
different ways. For specific purposes, one model might be better than another. But 
in general, there is no reason to expect that a single model will fare better for 
answering a number of different questions about the groups in question just as 
there is no best map. For certain purposes such as phylogenomic inference 
(inferring the function of a gene from phylogenetic information), a phylogenetic 
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tree that depicts three separate domains of life and some of the major clades 
within them really is a valuable tool in understanding diversity (Brown and 
Sjölander 2006). But not representing the endosymbiotic events which resulted in 
the origins of the plastids, mitochondria, and possibly all of the eukaryotes, would 
be tremendously misleading if wish to understand some of the most important 
innovations in the history of life on Earth.  
 
In a review of plastid evolution, Archibald (2009) utilizes a phylogenetic tree as 
an inference tool to discover exactly where and when endosymbiotic events 
occurred in the past. This single figure contains both a network and a special tree 
contained within this network.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Hypothesis for the origin and spread of photosynthesis in 
eukaryotes (due to Archibald 2009). 
 
In order to reconstruct something like figure 3, first, note that the gain of an 
internal symbiote and transition to a new kind of organism is simply one kind of 
change which gets passed along to descendants along the branch. Now use the 
current distribution of the symbiotes, together with information from other traits, 
to reconstruct an incomplete tree of the host cells that can itself be used to 
reconstruct the history of the past acquisition of symbiotes.  
 
Archibald’s reasoning exemplifies tree-thinking without the tree. We know that 
the history of these organisms has been heavily influenced by lateral transfer 
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events such as repeated endosymbiosis followed by the massive sharing of genetic 
information between symbiote and host. But in order to understand this history, 
we must recognize that bits of the history such as the vertical descent of the host 
cells form a tree. 
 
This also exemplifies multi-model inference because in order to understand one 
aspect of the history, we need to downplay or distort the history of other events. It 
would be a mistake to look at arbitrary gene trees to build the host tree in the first 
place since many of these will not share the host’s phylogeny. To represent the 
history of such genes in the same model as the vertical inheritance of others 
would obscure the unique role of the host cell. Here the tree model and the 
network model idealize different things and there is a necessary tradeoff in the 
representations. Which model is to be preferred depends on what you are trying to 
do. 
 
On the smaller scale, it is obvious that forcing the history of Darwin’s finches or 
human populations into a tree structure ignores information about migration and 
introgression between populations, which is essential to understanding their 
history. For example, it has been argued that there has been so much admixture in 
human history, that the concept of race makes no biological sense (Templeton 
1998; but see Andreasen 2004). On the other hand, trees of human populations are 
quite useful for understanding major ancestral migratory events (Soares et al. 
2009). Obviously there are migrations between human populations. But whether 
the amount of migration is “sufficient” to be best represented as collapsing the 
distinction between different lineages depends on what aspects of the lineages we 
are focusing on. For different inference purposes, different representations of 
genealogical history focusing on different aspects of that history are appropriate. 
Looking at trees of populations at the subspecific level such as those of humans is 
common in the growing field of phylogeography (Avise 2000). This is a clear 
example of the superiority of the modeling defense of trees since if there were 
genetic isolation between these lineages they would represent different species.  
 
One might think that we could get everything we want by simply “representing 
everything” in one giant model. This is false. Not only because it would be 
computationally intractable, which of course it would be, but also because models 
that focus on the right things are more explanatory than models which have no 
focus. An important part of the future of systematics will be recognizing how to 
take advantage of the fact that different models of the same phenomena can be 
independently fruitful (and fruitfully combined as well). Learning new and 
interesting things about past history will always be important. But learning when 
it is okay to ignore things we know can be equally important.  
 
4. Conclusion 
We have seen that phylogenetic trees are ubiquitous in biology. The justification 
for the use of trees has traditionally been that evolutionary processes are in fact 
tree-like. This justification is faulty. Attempting to interpret phylogenetic trees in 
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a literal way leads to the view that these trees entail many falsities about 
evolutionary history. Attacks on the universal tree of life thus appear to be 
justified. The goal of this paper is to argue that these attacks are not in conflict 
with the continued and justified use of trees and tree-thinking in biology. The use 
of phylogenetic trees can often be completely justified even if they are not 
entirely accurate representations of the world. Instead, these trees are models 
which contain idealizations. These models are used to better understand the 
world. Sometimes, for some purposes, a tree model is inappropriate. But often, 
trees are entirely appropriate and perhaps even the best models we have.  
 
Modeling and idealizations are widespread throughout the sciences. There is no 
particular reason to think that systematics should be any different. Evolutionary 
history is complicated. It is a sign of the advancement of the science of 
systematics that we not only take advantage of standard modeling practices from 
other disciplines, but that we understand that this is what it is that we are doing. It 
is true that belief in the existence of the tree of life as the big, universal, grand 
unifying, scale-free representation of all of the history of life should probably go 
away (if indeed biologists ever did believe there was such a tree).  Whether we 
can still talk about the tree of life as some modified version of this idea is, I think, 
an open question. Whether the problems with the universal tree extend to smaller 
trees as well will depend on the particular details of the case in question. But 
whatever the outcome of these debates, phylogenetic trees and the importance of 
tree-thinking are here to stay. The future of tree-thinking is bright as long as we 
can recognize the importance of tree-thinking without the tree. 
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